Drawdown-based performance fees, also known as high-water mark fees, are a type of performance fee that is only charged when the hedge fund returns to its previous high point. This means that the hedge fund manager only earns a performance fee after they have made back all of the investor's losses.
Drawdown-based performance fees can have a number of potential impacts on hedge fund incentives. On the one hand, they can align the incentives of the hedge fund manager with the incentives of the investors. This is because the hedge fund manager only earns a performance fee after they have made back all of the investor's losses.
On the other hand, drawdown-based performance fees can also incentivize hedge fund managers to take on more risk. This is because the hedge fund manager does not have to worry about returning the investor's capital before they can start earning a performance fee.
In addition, drawdown-based performance fees can also create a conflict of interest between the hedge fund manager and the investors. This is because the hedge fund manager may be incentivized to keep the fund open even when it is underperforming, in order to have the opportunity to recoup their losses and earn a performance fee.
Here are some specific examples of the potential impact of drawdown-based performance fees on hedge fund incentives:
- A hedge fund manager may be incentivized to take on more risk in order to generate higher returns. This is because the hedge fund manager only earns a performance fee after they have made back all of the investor's losses.
- A hedge fund manager may be incentivized to keep the fund open even when it is underperforming, in order to have the opportunity to recoup their losses and earn a performance fee. This is a conflict of interest between the hedge fund manager and the investors.
- A hedge fund manager may be incentivized to avoid closing out losing positions, in order to avoid realizing the losses and reducing the fund's high-water mark. This can lead to the fund losing more money than it would otherwise.
Overall, drawdown-based performance fees can have a mixed impact on hedge fund incentives. On the one hand, they can align the incentives of the hedge fund manager with the incentives of the investors. On the other hand, they can also incentivize hedge fund managers to take on more risk and to keep the fund open even when it is underperforming.
Investors should carefully consider the potential impact of drawdown-based performance fees on hedge fund incentives before investing in a hedge fund.
In addition to the potential impacts discussed above, drawdown-based performance fees can also have a number of other implications, such as:
- They can make it more difficult for investors to exit hedge funds. This is because investors may have to wait until the fund returns to its high-water mark before they can redeem all of their investment.
- They can reduce the hedge fund's liquidity. This is because the hedge fund may have to hold on to assets even when it would be advantageous to sell them in order to generate cash to meet redemption requests.
- They can make it more difficult for hedge funds to attract new investors. This is because investors may be reluctant to invest in a hedge fund that has a high-water mark that is above its current net asset value.
Overall, drawdown-based performance fees are a complex issue with a number of potential implications for hedge funds and their investors. Investors should carefully consider all of the potential impacts before investing in a hedge fund that charges drawdown-based performance fees.